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MR. LANDE: The final panel for the day is on self-regulation. Before it 
starts, I would like to call your attention to all of the superb material 
contained in the conference volume. I As long as I'm urging you to do 
additional reading in the antitrust/regulated industries area, I'd like to 
call your attention to articles by three of today's speakers that appeared 
in a recent issue of the Califomia Law Review. While Professor Baxter and 
others wrote on different antitrust topics,2 Professor Kahn and Judge 
Breyer squarely addressed the intersection of deregulation and antitrust.3 
These articles are both brilliant and directly relevant to the topic of this 
seminar, so I strongly urge you all to read them. 
I ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE CUTTING EDGE OF ANTITRUST: LESSONS FROM DEREGU-
LATION, Seminar Course Materials Uune 13, 1988). 
2 See Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 933 (1987) and 
the other articles in that issue. 
, See Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
1005 (1987); Kahn, Comment: Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 (1987). 
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This final panel, on self-regulation, will be chaired by Sue Braden. It 
also features two other speakers, Mike Shepherd and Charlie Brown. 
Both Mike and Charlie are last-minute additions to the seminar so I 
would like to give them special thanks. I should also like to point out that 
Michael Meyerson, a colleague of mine at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law, helped General Brown prepare his outline and talk. Since 
Mike Meyerson also was brought in at the last minute, I would like to 
give him special thanks as well. 
Sue Braden will start the discussion. She is a partner in the Washington, 
D.C. firm of Wilner & Scheiner, and had an interesting and varied career 
before that. Sue has worked at the Federal Trade Commission, as assistant 
to Commissioner (and, later, acting Chairman) Clanton. She also worked 
as an assistant to Chairman Miller. Sue has had a number of other 
interesting jobs and has done an incredible amount of pro bono and bar 
association work, but to save time I will only mention one other item-
her work as a Consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United 
States on a project to evaluate the competition advocacy and regulatory 
intervention programs of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade 
Commission. Needless to say, the topic of this panel, self-regulation and 
the intersection of antitrust and regulation, is an area that she is very 
familiar with. 
Our second speaker will be Mike Shepherd, the Senior Deputy Comp-
troller for Corporate and Economic Programs at the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Mike has responsibility for a wide range of 
competition policy, economic, and planning activities. He, too, has an 
interesting background, including private practice and other government 
service, but there is one item that is of special relevance to today's seminar. 
In 1980 Mike was Assistant Director for Policy Coordination on the 
Reagan-Bush Presidential Transition Team, or, in other words, one of a 
small group who tried to figure out what the Reagan Administration 
should attempt to accomplish in the areas of competition and regulatory 
policy and deregulation. Mike was one of the earliest architects of the 
developments that have taken place in these areas during the past eight 
years and thus had a crucial effect on the Reagan Administration's accom-
plishments. So, even though the topic of this panel is self-regulation, I 
hope Mike can be persuaded to tie into this theme some thoughts about 
what the Reagan Administration in 1980 hoped it would achieve in 
the competition/regulation/deregulatory areas, and how much of this it 
actually was able to accomplish. 
Our final speaker is Charlie Brown, the Attorney General of the State 
of West Virginia. Charlie previously served as an attorney at the Federal 
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Trade Commission and also has been in private practice. I also should 
tell you that he is currently the Chairman of the Antitrust Committee of 
the National Association of Attorneys General. In this capacity he has 
undertaken a large number of important (if sometimes controversial) 
tasks and has assumed many vital responsibilities, including spearheading 
an effort to repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act. But today he will focus 
on self-regulation and other competitive issues in another industry he 
knows quite well, the cable industry, presenting insights he developed 
together with Professor Meyerson. But first we will hear from Sue 
Braden. 
Ms. BRADEN: A copy of the Report on Regulatory Reform4 prepared by 
the Industry Regulation Committee of the Antitrust Section, has been 
made available to each participant today. This report was put together 
primarily under Don Flexner's leadership in 1985 and adopted by the 
Section's Council. The Report sets forth the competitive principles that 
we think the regulatory agencies should live by. It's a useful reference 
which contains a good historical summary of how regulation came to be. 
I would like to make one or two brief remarks and then turn it over to 
our panel. Let me begin by reading seven principles to use to analyze the 
effect of regulation, which come from a book that was recently published 
on deregulation. 
(1) Is the regulation consistent with market incentives, to the maximum 
extent possible? 
(2) Will the remedy work? 
(3) Will the chosen remedy minimize the cost burdens of compliance 
consistent with achieving that objective? 
(4) Will the benefits flowing from the regulation go to consumers or 
will competition substantially exceed the cost? 
(5) Will the regulation or remedy adversely affect competition? 
(6) Does the regulation preserve the freedom of informed individual 
choice to the maximum extent consistent with consumer welfare? 
(7) States' rights should be considered. The federal regulator needs to 
ask, "To what extent is this problem appropriate for federal regulation 
and amenable to a centrally administered national standard, or is it 
perhaps best left to a local administrative agency? 
1 ABA Antitrust Section, Industry Regulation Committee, Report on Regulatory Reform, 
54 ANTITRUST L.J. 501 (1985). 
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These seven principles are not too dissimilar from others that you've 
heard earlier today as "lessons from deregulation." What may shock you 
is that the author of the book is Michael Pertschuk, and the book was 
written two-and-a-half to three years ago, at the end of his term as 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.s 
It is useful to begin with the words of Mike Pertschuk to demonstrate 
my belief that deregulation is not a political issue. Deregulation and 
regulatory reform have a great deal of support from both ends of the 
political spectrum. I think where the consensus breaks down is on how 
fast deregulation should proceed and the role of the antitrust laws in 
implementing deregulation in certain industries. I plan also to talk about 
that a little bit at the end of our panel's presentations. 
Mike Shepherd, as some of you know, currently is the Deputy Comp-
troller. He will talk about the deregulation experience of the financial 
institutions industry and share with us some observations from his time 
in the transition team. 
Attorney General Brown, from West Virginia, plans to spend most of 
his time discussing the deregulation experience in the cable industry. 
MR. SHEPHERD: I have been asked to talk about the goals of deregula-
tion from a broader perspective than just banking law, from my tour of 
duty in the transition team, the Department of Justice, the White House, 
and now the Treasury Department. 
The Reagan Administration was determined to bring about greater 
regulatory certainty and introduce sound economic analysis, including 
formal costlbenefit analysis, to regulatory decisions generally. Two of the 
most important aspects of that initiative were the establishment of the 
Vice President's Regulatory Task Force, and the issuance of Executive 
Order 12,291 which created the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs in OMB. This was the first effort to impose a formal process 
overseen by an independent office cre~ted to carry out the President's 
wishes in this area, in addition to his reliance on the sound judgment of 
his appointees. 
The Administration's regulatory philosophy was based on the assump-
tion that free market forces allowed to operate without unnecessary 
interference will provide the best distribution of resources. The only 
reasons that the market alone cannot be relied on are when there are 
factors special to that industry that make the operation of the free market 
inefficient or there are some overriding national interests that can't be 
5 M. PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION (1982). 
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protected through the operation of the free markets. Those are rare 
situations. In the case of the continued, heavy involvement of the federal 
government in the banking industry, there are three basic justifications: 
(1) the provision of federal deposit insurance; (2) banks and thrifts are 
considered to merit special attention as the central nervous system of the 
economy; and (3) the banking system is the principal vehicle through 
which monetary policy is effected. 
Our overall goal can be summed up in James C. Miller's definition 
of deregulation as "the elimination of government-imposed barriers to 
competition." 
One major achievement in the antitrust area during the Reagan Ad-
ministration has been candid and predictable enforcement, exemplified 
through speeches, the Merger Guidelines, and the government's briefs. 
Clear enforcement policies, with perhaps a more permissive view of non-
horizontal mergers, made important rationalizations possible in many 
industries. 
In many regulated industries, I think technology made deregulation 
inevitable, or at least caused regulatory principles to be reviewed. This 
trend is particularly evident in the financial services industry. 
The financial intermediary's role is threatened by online services and 
other ways of gathering and transmitting information that permits debt-
ors and creditors to interact directly, destroying the intermediary'S mo-
nopoly on information. Services organizations with their own databases, 
and the computing power to manipulate the data, coupled with telecom-
munications, can provide potential investors with the same credit and 
market information that was once available only to the intermediaries. 
Intermediation is no longer as profitable, therefore, to the banks or 
others. While these developments should be heralded for providing im-
portant consumer benefits, like other innovations, though, they call into 
question the old frameworks that were set up after the Depression. 
Banks also diversify their activities through securitization and other 
techniques to rid their balance sheets of certain assets and still maintain 
fee income. Again, that is technology-driven. Were it not for their tre-
mendous information processing capabilities, banks would not be able to 
package the deals for investors and then still do the servicing at a profit-
able rate. 
From the perspective of antitrust law, perhaps the principal impact of 
deregulation has been the expansion of relevant markets. The last eight 
years have seen a remarkable increase in the number of firms offering 
financial services, blurring the old lines of demarcation between indu-
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tries. The most obvious example is the savings and loan industry-which 
lost its protected interest rate differenti<il with the elimination of Reg Q, 
and is now making commercial loans-but breaks have also opened up 
in the old walls separating investment and commercial banking, real 
estate, and insurance. 
Coupled with reciprocal interstate banking statutes enacted by most 
states, product deregulation has greatly changed relevant markets. Reor-
ganizing these marketplace conditions, the Department of Justice has 
indicated that it will allow an additional 200 point increase in the Herfin-
dahl Hirschman Index for bank mergers over the general standards of 
the Merger Guidelines. It may seem ironic, but I believe that the only 
mergers that we would either deny or the government would challenge 
would be between small banks in a very remote location. In approving 
Wells Fargo Bank's 1987 acquisition of the consumer trust business of 
the Bank of America, for example, I found that the relevant market was 
at best the State of California, and noted the existence of substantial non-
bank competition, especially from brokerage firms, including those from 
out of state. 
One of the most important examples of deregulation leading to market 
expansion are the Comptroller's decisions to permit liberalized intrastate 
branching. We have now approved national bank applications to branch 
across county lines in Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Flor-
ida, and similar applications are pending in nine other states. The federal 
branching statute, the McFadden Act, permits national banks to branch 
only to the extent state-chartered institutions engaged in the banking 
business are permitted to do so. In each of these states, banks were 
forbidden to branch outside their home counties. We approved the appli-
cations, reasoning that, with the broader powers conferred through de-
regulation, state-chartered thrifts were engaged in the banking business, 
and noting that they have broader branching authority. 
We have constructed elaborate models for how new securities activities 
would have to be in separately incorporated subsidiaries of banks in 
order for the banks to be able to pursue their traditional customers, for 
example, to the commercial paper markets. 
Preparing to discuss self-regulation with you, I was reminded of work-
ing on a speech for then-Deputy Attorney General Carol Dinkins. She was 
invited to address a National Association of Self-Regulatory Association's 
luncheon in Washington, assuming that she would make some wonderful 
speech about how, "It's great that you self-regulatory associations are 
filling in now that we're starting to make progress on the deregulation 
front." Instead, every draft we could get through the Antitrust Division 
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said, "You watch out, you price-fixers ... we're watching you guys all the 
time." 
There's really something to that. Industry standards can quickly be-
come price standards. Self-regulatory organizations can also be used to 
otherwise enforce cartel behavior through the management committee 
of the self-regulatory organization that can work to exclude nonmembers. 
While in some situations regulatory agencies may intend to occupy the 
field and oppose intrusion, there are many occasions where SROs can 
help to fill gaps or perform services. 
The question for the future of deregulation is whether the political 
momentum can be sustained. I think the technological advancements 
that I've discussed will continue to push deregulation and continue to 
mock the outdated statutory schemes under which we still operate. Con-
gressional inaction forces the regulators and the courts to go through 
greater gymnastics in the interest of overall good of consumer benefits 
and competition. I believe that deregulation will remain good politics. It 
doesn't mean de-supervision, and that's important, both in the airline 
industry and in the banking and savings and loan industry. Just because 
we're trying to get government out of more things doesn't mean that 
the remaining things the government does should be done poorly or 
inefficiently. I think there is a great deal of concern that the safety 
and soundness of the banking system might be jeopardized by further 
deregulation. We don't feel that way, so long as adequate supervision is 
maintained. 
It's important to note that the major transportation deregulation bills-
motor carriers, railroads, and the Airline Deregulation Act-were first 
discussed under Republican Presidents before Democrat-controlled Con-
gresses, signed by President Carter, and now enforced and expanded 
in the Reagan Administration. Partisan politics should not stop good 
developments. Although it's an overused word in Washington, I believe 
financial reform is a "competitiveness" issue. We have an interest in 
American firms not being unfairly impeded by the regulatory structures 
that they have to deal with. In the increasing market and global competi-
tion that banks and so many other firms that you all represent face, 
we don't have the luxury of having an out-of-date regulatory system. 
Through the Reagan Administration's efforts, and the efforts of academ-
ics and practitioners, we have championed free market principles. That's 
done through regulatory action, through case law, through the amicus 
program, making the right personnel choices in the Administration and 
good judicial appointments. I think the battle has been won, in large 
part, because of the soundness of the ideas from the law schools and the 
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economics departments and the ability of advocates to translate those 
concepts into meaningful arguments before regulatory tribunals and 
before the courts. 
MR. BROWN: It's hard to be an antitrust lawyer and believe in self-
regulation. After all, an economist would point out that there are three 
ways to run an industry: either regulated, competitive, or a cartel. If we 
really take that to an extreme, then self-regulation is the cartel. Obviously, 
in today's complicated economic world, those three choices are not always 
distinct ones. There are mixtures all the time. Industries are regulated 
and competitive and self-regulated. Yet, as a general rule, I think we, as 
a society, certainly favor competition over regulation, and undoubtedly 
we, as antitrust lawyers, maintain that very overwhelming presumption. 
The states are very much in the ball game in terms of antitrust enforce-
ment. I think if we are going to deregulate, then we must recognize that 
the need for antitrust enforcement becomes much greater. One cannot, 
for example, deregulate airlines and then allow mergers to a point of 
reducing overall competition. 
When you have so few competitors, the opportuity and the ability to 
fix prices increases dramatically. Witness the soft drink industry, where 
a few giants in the marketplace were able to convince the Congress 
to stop intrabrand competition and limit their territories to absolutes. 
Thereafter, with two or three companies knowing for certain that they 
not only were the only competitors in the territory, but that there were 
also no potential competitors in that area, they could price as they wanted. 
The ongoing grand juries all over the eastern part of the country bear 
out that a failure to regulate, combined with an exemption from antitrust 
enforcement, will only further attempts to restrict competition. 
My topic today centers on the effects of deregulation on the cable 
industry. The effects of cable deregulation have become of great interest 
to the states. In fact, the Antitrust Committee ofthe National Association 
of Attorneys General, which I chair, has set up a five-state working group 
on cable matters consisting of New York, West Virginia, Ohio, Texas, 
and Maryland. This working group is looking at the issue of the competi-
tive effects of deregulation on cable television. 
Cable television really is a distribution service-a retail business-for 
cable programming. The cable programming service has traditionally 
been carried over coaxial wires. There are competitive modes to get cable 
television into the hands of consumers, but the competitive modes are 
not yet well developed. Wireless cable and Satellite Master Antenna 
Television, or SMA TV, are examples of these new distribution competi-
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tors. We also have seen in rural areas, certainly in my state, the develop-
ment of satellite dishes as a separate programming delivery option. 
Coaxial cable, however, remains the dominant means of distribution 
and it is a means that by its very nature has been recognized by some 
courts as a natural monopoly. Yet Congress, through the Cable Commu-
nications Act of 1984, has effectively institutionalized that monopoly by 
preempting state and local control over key regulatory functions-the 
ability to set rates and the ability to control programming choice. 
In the 1984 Act, Congress created a definition of effective com petition 
which has extended deregulation to every television market. The over-
whelming majority of television consumers now live in areas where over-
the-air reception of signals is impossible and cable is the only viable option 
for viewing television. 
As a response to this wholesale deregulatory agenda, I filed the first 
antitrust and consumer protection case6 after the Cable Communications 
Act took effect. We filed in February of 1987 when the cable company 
in our state capital did what they call re-tiering-that is, they took a 
situation where they would offer only a few channels on segregated tiers 
and they eliminated these options, effectively stating, "Now you're going 
to have to take all of the programming we give you with a sixty-seven 
percent price increase to boot." This was true all over the country. Re-
tiering took place in a massive way once the Congress gave the cable 
industry carte blanche to do what it wanted. 
Our case proposes a tying theory that claims the cable operator is 
forcing the consumer to buy a whole host of channels when the consumer 
previously had the choice just to get a few channels. 
We also rest our case on a theory of unfairness. We have a "little FTC 
Act" as well as a "little Sherman Act," and we are filing it under the 
concept of unfairness. With the extreme market power that the cable 
company has in the state capital, we consider the bunching together of 
channels to be an unfair act or practice. We also allege a deception count 
in relation to the way in which the whole program was marketed. 
We did win our first round. It took a year. But the cable company, not 
surprisingly, removed to federal court and said, "This whole issue is 
preempted by Congress. You have used the doctrine of artful pleading. 
You're really just saying we're deregulated and you're upset about that." 
6 West Virginia v. Americal Television & Communic. Inc .. No. 87-C-659 (W. Va. Cir. 
Ct. Kanawha Cty. filed Feb. 16, 1987) (See Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1307, 
at 559 (March 19, 1987». 
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The federal judge disagreed, saying that the State Consumer Protection 
Act and the State Antitrust Act do apply to what the cable companies 
did, and he remanded the case back to the state court.' We had brought 
the case, and have brought the case, only under state law. We are hoping 
that case, continuing in the Kanawha County Circuit Court in Charleston, 
West Virginia, may help develop some of the law in this area. 
The essential analytical point to stress is that vertical restraints become 
very important to a deregulated industry which demonstrates monopoly 
tendencies. I know the vertical restraint is something that is more frowned 
on from the national federal government level, but tying is important 
when you have freed up everything else. In our case, if there is that 
natural monopoly, then economists would agree that the cable operator 
cannot use the power in one market to control the next one. That's what 
tying is all about. 
Another area of concern in cable enforcement that has been amplified 
by deregulation has to do with the vertical integration of large corpora-
tions which own multiple cable systems, with cable programming con-
cerns. This overs hip control beween program producers and program 
distributors has stimulated accusations, based on some circumstantial 
evidence, that cable programming is only sold to, and through, coaxial 
cable operators. If the operator of an alternative cable delivery technol-
ogy, like wireless cable, would like to get that programming, they have 
been finding that it has been quite difficult. Likewise, the SMATVs, the 
apartment building concept, are having that same difficulty; they are 
unable to get essential programming with any degree of success. The 
MSO (Multiple Service Operators), in essence, appear to be acting as a 
bottleneck for programming delivery to the competitive technologies in 
the marketplace. 
What's especially upsetting about these allegations, if true, is that the 
cable industry originally sold the idea of deregulation to Congress by 
saying, "We've got all kinds of competition coming on line from new 
cable delivery technologies and therefore we have to be freed from 
control of our local operations." Now, with a deregulated monopoly in 
hand, the cable industry may be attempting to drive out the new competi-
tion by wielding their big stick of monopoly distribution in front of 
vertically integrated cable programmers. 
That's why the whole area of vertical restraints-and vertical integra-
tion, the vertical ownership that has taken place and continues to take 
place-has been of real interest to us in the states. 
7 West Virginia v. Americal Television & Communic. Inc., No. 2:87-0203 (S.D. W. Va. 
Feb. 9, 1988). (See Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1354, at 331 (Feb. 25,1988). 
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I think, therefore, that vertical integration in the cable industry, com-
bined with a deregulated monopoly status for the cable operator in each 
local community, has produced some issues that are very ripe to be looked 
at from any perspective. When market power in a natural monopoly is 
extended to keep out anybody else, one can certainly feel confident in 
the assertion that deregulation in that instance has failed. 
The cable industry is going to be a fascinating industry to be watching 
and examining. We do have our five-state working group which will be 
looking at it, and we'll have a report or more at our October meeting. 
Ms. BRADEN: The final comment I would like to make before we go to 
our panelist commentators is this: I don't think that deregulation is going 
to stop, and the reason it won't stop isn't due to antitrust, this panel, or 
any of the books that some of the people have written. It won't stop 
because almost all the markets that have been regulated for the past 
hundred years are changing, and it is in the interest of those players to 
restructure the rules. As market power erodes in certain sectors and 
there are new entrants with political power, you will see the rules change; 
you will see deregulation; and you may see that new regulation-not 
reregulation, but some other new type of regulation-will come up in its 
place. I think cable will be an interesting area to watch for this. 
The pace of deregulation of industries is going to depend in large part 
on the effectiveness or the perceived effectiveness of the antitrust laws. 
If I were to have given any advice to Bill Baxter or Rick Rule, it is that 
they should have had a Deputy for Marketing, because the perception 
on the street, as well as on the Hill and other places, is that the antitrust 
agencies have packed it in; that unless you had people come in to confess 
price-fixing meetings, the Division simply wasn't going to interrupt its 
day to be bothered by other types of competitive problems. 
However, that perception is not true. Both agencies have tremendously 
talented staff who have been very aggressive in different areas. But the 
perception has in part become reality, or the reality is the perception. I 
believe it is unfortunate, because deregulation now has momentum. As 
Professor Kahn said, it would be a shame to have this progress reversed 
because of a misperception as to the commitment of the antitrust au-
thorities to the competitive objectives of deregulation. 
Self-regulation is a misnomer. Either you're regulated or you're not, 
and if you're not, you're subject to the antitrust laws. You can regulate 
yourself all you wish, but that's not going to change the analysis about 
whether you have antitrust immunity or not-and it shouldn't. If industry 
groups want to get together and try to do some good things and keep 
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each other from violating the antitrust laws, that's all to the good. But it 
doesn't supplant antitrust responsibility, and certainly shouldn't supplant 
regulation where a case has been made out that it benefits consumers. 
And I submit that there are probably very few of those left. 
Some of the best work that has been done by both antitrust agencies 
in the past ten years has been a bipartisan effort in the competition 
advocacy programs. I have been particularly concerned to see this effort 
receive such a bad rap on the Hill from the oversight committees of both 
the Justice Department and the FTC. I believe much of the problem has 
resulted because this work is misunderstood. The problem is that when 
the Justice Department intervenes at the FERC and does the excellent 
work that Don Kaplan and his people have done over the years, they 
don't come up with a statistic at the end ofthe day. There is no "Antitrust 
Division wins one," or the FERC says, "We really appreciated hearing 
from you today." There's no acknowledgment of the benefit of that 
advocacy. Therefore, the antitrust agencies have no statistics to take to 
the Hill to justify what they did with their budget for the last year. So 
there's no statistical accountability in a sense, which has been one of the 
problems of being able to justify the legitimate expenditure of funds in 
these areas. 
When Professor Baxter took over the Antitrust Division, there was a 
lot of brouhaha about his amicus program. This was very valuable work 
in the deregulatory side. The time and effort spent in intervening in 
other agency proceedings wasn't being done by any other concern for 
the consumer. Advocacy before the regulatory agencies was clearly done 
by people who speak out of self-interest, and there was no one speaking 
for the public. The agency staff's primary job is not to look at competition 
problems; their primary job is to see that the "public interest" in a very 
broad sense is served-and competition is only one dimension of that 
public interest. 
I believe that the antitrust bar needs to support this effort by the 
antitrust agencies. This should not be a partisan issue. Competition advo-
cacy simply needs to be better understood. It doesn't supplant antitrust 
enforcement. As a matter of fact, it might enhance or accelerate antitrust 
enforcement to the extent that you may have deregulation occurring in 
some areas sooner. For that reason, I think it's a loss that those programs 
have received short shrift. 
The title of my remarks is "Deregulation: Political Test of Antitrust." 
The perception and understanding of the role of antitrust is very impor-
tant to the reality of how or if deregulation will continue. 
1989] DEREGULATION: SELF-REGULATION 821 
Last week, in the Business Section of the Washington Post, this ad by the 
American Association of Railroads appeared which said: "If Congress 
passes this bill" (CURE-railroad reregulation) "soon you will see this 
one." "American consumers for high transportation costs-it's going to 
cost you $15 billion a year." 
If you go back and look at the testimony about the bill, you will see 
complaints about antitrust problems in isolated geographic sections of 
the country. The issue is who is going to address these concerns-the 
regulatory agency or the antitrust authorities and the courts. If the ICC 
doesn't feel that it can or should intervene, then perhaps we do need to 
take a look and see what the antitrust agencies can do in this area. And 
if not, there's a legitimate question as to whether there is a need for 
legislation. I'm not here to take sides one way or the other, but to use the 
CURE bill as an illustration of how important it is to realize that the 
perception of no enforcement remedy for a legitimate concern may result 
in bad law. If there's a perception that the Antitrust Division and the FTC 
are not equipped or will not respond, the result may be new regulation. 
Tom Kauper said recently that if deregulation is largely a legislative 
matter-which it is-then the perception of legislators about the effec-
tiveness of antitrust enforcement is absolutely critical. I think he's right, 
and that the antitrust agencies do need to spend more time being con-
cerned about that perception. 
Commissioner Strenio spent a great deal of time talking about strong 
antitrust enforcement at the FTC. I believe this is accurate. The 7-Vpl 
Pepsi merger was the highwater mark. If you look statistically at the 
number of mergers that have been investigated or blocked after that 
period and other matters that the FTC has initiated, I believe you see a 
real change. 
The situation is really not all that different in the Antitrust Division. 
The staff, particularly in the criminal area, is outstanding. And while 
there has been some shift of resources, I think that the antitrust agencies 
really are doing a very good job. There has been active antitrust enforce-
ment. But there also has been too much loose jargon that has damaged 
the agencies, as well as the progress of deregulatory efforts. 
To the extent that we as members of the ABA and the bar have a duty, 
it is to be sure that that message gets through to our clients and others 
that the authorities are doing their job and that the competition advocacy 
program is part of that effort. 
Deregulation will be a political test of the antitrust laws. If there is a 
perception that the antitrust agencies and the laws are not being enforced, 
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then regulation will slow down, and it may stop for a while. If there is a 
perception that there is a "hands off' antitrust attitude, you may see 
reregulation that is unnecessary, and perhaps harmful in the long run. 
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 
MR. LANDE: Would any of the panelists like to make another comment? 
If not, I'll take questions from the audience. 
QUESTION: I've been a little disturbed this afternoon on the meaning 
that is attached to deregulation. I was assuming all along that deregula-
tion refers to price and to entry into markets, and it did not extend to 
safety. Professor Kahn, for example, has said that deregulation in airlines 
and trucks has not caused a loss of safety-maybe he's right, maybe he's 
wrong-but if it has, or if there is a danger of it, we can always add to 
the safety regulation; we don't have to go back to full industry regulation. 
However, the term "economic deregulation" has also been used here 
to refer to, I think, general deregulation of financial institutions which 
would involve not only deregulation of their interest rates and whether 
they need a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to open up another 
bank or another brokerage firm, but also to the character of their invest-
ments. 
We have been passing through a crisis of degeneration of the quality 
of financial institution assets. The federal government has an obligation 
not only to protect the creditors of financial institutions, particularly 
depositors in banks, but also to protect itself, because the government 
simply cannot-at least, it feels it cannot-allow a large financial institu-
tion to fail. To say that these financial institutions should be deregulated 
and allowed to do whatever the market pushes them to do, seems to me 
to be creating a great danger. 
A commercial bank that invests only in accounts receivable and notes 
receivable and so on runs some risks, but these can be worked out with 
deposit insurance on an actuarial basis. But, when the bank is also allowed 
to invest in long-term securities of underdeveloped countries, in oil dril-
ling ventures, take equity positions in real estate projects, and so on, this 
is a safety problem akin to that which the FAA has to deal with in airlines. 
I was wondering why we should be talking about deregulation of that 
area, or even allowing banks to go into the brokerage business, it looks 
like, with ease of entry. Nobody has ever said that there is a serious 
problem on ease of entry into the brokerage business, so I don't see why 
a bank has to be given authority to do it. 
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MR. BAXTER: It seems to me that the failure of a bank is quite unlike 
an airline accident. Nobody gets killed. I put bank failure very distinctly 
in the category of financial regulation. 
The insurance agencies have created a serious problem by permitting 
depository institutions to engage in the most fanciful kind of accounting, 
in the first instance, by being much, much too slow to close failing institu-
tions down. They have also failed to distinguish between institutions that 
have extremely thin capitalization or a negative capitalization in any 
reasonable accounting sense, and adequately capitalized institutions. 
There is no reason to prevent adequately capitalized institutions that are 
betting their own money from engaging in a wide variety of financial 
assets. 
But we have created a situation in the United States where, as a financial 
institution approaches failure, it becomes an entirely sensible long-run 
profit-maximizing strategy to bet on the horses. You take your last final 
plunge in some highly speculative assets, and if it pays off you are back 
in great shape. If it doesn't, you slip the bill to Uncle Sam. Now, that does 
not seem to me terribly difficult to understand. The banking authorities 
seem to me to have been incredibly slow in facing up to its implications 
and doing anything about it. 
MR. KAHN: I wanted to raise financial markets as a possible case in 
which deregulation may be discredited. I was hesitant because I don't 
have a feel for the financial markets, so I don't go around advocating 
deregulation there. 
But the critical question, Bill, that follows from your comment is: Are 
you suggesting, then, that one can safely permit competition, freedom 
of pricing, freedom of choosing your assets, freedom to compete in 
interest rates for deposits, but all one has to have is sufficiently assiduous 
regulatory scrutiny of a different kind, that is to say, of the capital/liability 
ratios on behalf of the deposit insurance institutions, the need for which 
I take it we all accept? 
MR. BAXTER: I certainly would accept the need for depository insur-
ance institutions of a certain order of magnitude. I readily accept the 
idea that the ordinary family cannot be expected to keep track of the 
solvency of its depository institutions, but nevertheless ought to be able 
to use one with complete safety. However, the average family does not 
need a $100,000 limit, much less the incredibly large sums one can get 
by taking all possible permutations of the family which are allowed. We 
have permitted the limits to get too large. 
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I am saying two different things. If you can impose sensible accounting 
rules and keep track of what is going on well enough to close institutions 
down before they have substantial negative net worth, then the insurance 
fund suffers no loss. That's one possibility. A second possibility is to draw 
a distinction between institutions that are in different ranges of capital 
adequacy, and either control the assets which they invest differently or 
vary the insurance premium that is charged for the government insur-
ance, to have something like actuarial reality. We have not done any of 
those three things. 
MR. SHEPHERD: I'd like to just address that briefly if I could. I agree 
with many of the questioner's points, and I don't think he expects me to. 
He raises the point I was trying to make when I said that deregulation 
does not mean de-supervision. It seems to me that,just as further deregu-
lation is tied in part to vigorous antitrust enforcement, so is future dereg-
ulation and new powers for banks and other financial institutions tied to 
both Congress' confidence and the public'S confidence in the supervisory 
process. Assuming that we can do that job effectively, it would be very 
unfortunate to bar from entry the most likely firms to enter the invest-
ment banking business, the commercial banks. 
We are, to follow Professor Baxter's point, pursuing both risk-based 
capital guidelines which discount for certain government-guaranteed 
assets on a bank's balance sheet and try to achieve some measure of 
international convergence on capital adequacy. 
MR. REIN: I have a question. In the last few minutes we've been talking 
about goals of economic activity, like safety, or the ability of a small 
depositor to avoid the informational problem of risk, which appear to be 
at least suggestions of market failure. That is, if you left the industries 
alone, somehow, they would not protect fully, at least individually, the 
interests which we deem to be socially necessary, and that's the reason 
for safety impositions and special insurance. 
Coming back to self-regulation for a moment, suppose that the partici-
pants in these industries decided that that was a true problem, one of 
public confidence, one which could cause it to be reregulated, and they 
formed a group or association to do some of the things that are socially 
necessary, and now we have that under the antitrust laws. 
One question is: Should we permit them to do that? Let's assume they 
say, "We formed a trucking safety group and we imposed a lot of self-
regulation, and we're going around in a neutral way inspecting trucks, 
because we're afraid that if we have too many accidents that Congress 
will reregulate us." This, of course, reduces competition from being the 
safest trucking outfit and getting the lowest insurance rates, or whatever. 
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The question is: Do we consider the antitrust laws as they look at this, 
and under the Professional Engineers case8 it kind of segregates that, 
because you can look at factors that are socially beneficial versus factors 
that repudiate competition itself? Are they properly structured to deal 
with these problems? Must we have a legislative initiative? Should you be 
able to put those kind of agreements in front of courts and defend 
them as necessary to preserve the industry against some other kind of 
government intervention? 
MR. BROWN: Sure, you can put any practice-I mean, that's why so 
much of the antitrust laws are court-made. Congress sets the general law 
and then we continue to work with it. Under the rule of reason, I think 
it's "power, purpose, and effect." What is the purpose of the safety rules, 
what is the effect of them, how much market power is there of the 
trucking companies who designed the safety rules? I think it goes back 
to whether they can devise safety rules for the industry. The answer is 
maybe. I mean, we start designing, we start looking under the rule of 
reason at all the factors involved. Certainly the lawyers that advise the 
trucking association should have just as much case law and economic data 
as those who would look at it from the government side. 
MR. REIN: Yes. But I wonder whether you can look at all the factors. 
For example, what if a trucking company said, "We are excluded from 
this industry because we can't meet the basic standards and they won't 
allow us into their group trucking association, and this is impairing our 
ability to get cargoes from people who don't want to be seen as dealing 
with a renegade and whose insurance won't cover them if they deal with 
a renegade." That fellow brings a case and he says, "I am excluded by 
this agreement, this is an 'essential facility,' and they shouldn't be in the 
safety business." I'm wondering whether, under Professional Engineers, he 
wouldn't have a darn good argument that all this safety stuff is a repudia-
tion of the market-you can't bring a repudiation of the market into an 
efficiency defense in an antitrust case; we better go get the Congress to 
do it. I'm just wondering what the panel thinks the chances are that you 
could defend that agreement if you are faced with a Professional Engineers 
argument. 
I'm reminded of the NCAA case,9 in which the Court said, "You can 
make all these arguments about the glory of college football, but they 
don't count, we don't want to listen to them, they have nothing to do with 
the issue." 
8 National Soc'y of Prof'( Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
9 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 
(1984). 
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MR. BAXTER: The Professional Engineers case said private parties can't 
limit a particular kind of rivalry on the ground that it is bad for consum-
ers. If your trucking safety committee also includes an agreement that 
nobody will have their trucks checked more frequently than monthly, or 
something of this sort, then it seems you have raised a serious question. 
But if it is merely an agreement that "we will all employ minimum 
standards and, of course, everybody is free to employ more vigorous 
ones, or to advertise that he employs more vigorous ones, or to announce 
that he has better safety results, and so on and so forth," I can't imagine 
that it would cause a problem. We issued a number of Business Review 
Letters that would respond to that basic description, although certainly 
not any dealing with trucking safety. 
Ms. BRADEN: I would make one other proposal for people to think 
about. In the middle of the 1970s, there were a set of hearings before 
the Judiciary Committee on the Competition Improvements Act which 
would have required regulatory agencies to issue competitive impact 
statements, like an environmental impact statement, so that when an 
agency acts there is some public accountability-to show that the agency 
thought about competitive issues. I would like to see in either a Bush or 
a Dukakis Administration some effort to look at reopening those hearings 
and seeing if legislation in that area could help us get a report card on 
the advocacy programs. At least this would provide a measure of the 
effectiveness of the deregulation program and help legitimize the anti-
trust agencies' work. 
MR. KAHN: I certainly agree. I think I testified in favor of that bill. A 
lot of the intention of that bill was incorporated in the standards in some 
of the deregulation acts, about whether it is necessary and whether it is 
the least restrictive competition method available. I think it might still be 
salutary to have a broader application. 
